3.1.3 Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?

Objection 1. It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still have become incarnate. As long as a cause remains, the effect also remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Many other things are to be considered in Incarnation of Christ besides absolution from sin"; and these were discussed earlier (3.1.2). Therefore if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

Objection 2. Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power to perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect. But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power manifested in a special manner by which power things infinitely distant are united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is God. And in this work especially the universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch as the last creature--viz. man--is united to the first principle--viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

Objection 3. Further, human nature has not been made more capable of grace by sin.^[1] But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from human nature any good it was capable of.^[2] Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

Objection 4. Further, God's predestination is eternal. But it is said of Christ (Romans 1:4): "Who was predestined the Son of God in power." Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should become incarnate, in order to fulfill God's predestination.

Objection 5. Further, the mystery of Incarnation was revealed to the first man, as is plain from Genesis 2:23, "This now is bone of my bones," and so on. The Apostle says this is "a great sacrament . . . in Christ and in the Church," as is plain from Ephesians 5:32. But man could not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels could not, as Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18). Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding what is set down in Luke 19:10, "For the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost"; "Therefore, if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would not have come." And on 1 Timothy 1:15, "Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners," a gloss^[3] says, "There was no cause of Christ's coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine."

I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent ought rather to be given to this opinion.

For such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, Incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate.^[4]

Reply to Objection 1. All the other causes which are assigned in the preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had not sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in order to know and carry out everything needful. But because man, on deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford him the remedy of salvation. Hence, on John 1:14, "And the Word was made flesh," St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): "Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals thee; for Christ came and overthrew the vices of the flesh."

Reply to Objection 2. The way things are produced from nothing shows in itself the infinity of divine power. Again, it suffices for the perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.

Reply to Objection 3. A double capability may be remarked in human nature: one, in respect of the order of natural power, and this is always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its natural capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine power, which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak of pertains to this. But God does not fulfill all such capabilities, otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is false, as stated earlier (1.105.6). But there is no reason why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom; hence it is written (Romans 5:20): "Where sin abounded, grace did more abound." Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we say: "O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer!"

Reply to Objection 4. Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to be brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the work of Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.

Reply to Objection 5. Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows the cause.^[5]

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Footnotes:
1. The unstated authority here is Romans 6:1-2.
2. The argument of this objection is as follows: (1) Human nature can be joined with divine nature; (2) sin cannot bring about anything good; (3) sin is not responsible for the capacity of human nature to be joined with divine nature; (4) this capacity would exist apart from sin; (5) God would not leave a human capacity unfulfilled; (6) therefore Christ would have become incarnate to join human and divine nature, even apart from sin. This argument raises an issue (i.e., no. 5) that would become important later in Catholic theology: the question of whether God is obliged to give human beings the beatific vision for the completion of their natures. See Aquinas's response to this objection below.
3. When Thomas refers to the "gloss" he is speaking of explanatory notes on scriptural texts that were originally written either between the lines or in the margins of Scripture. These notes began as simple one-word definitions of unfamiliar terms, but grew into more elaborate commentaries that sought to explain the literal sense of the text.
4. Thomas is stating his view with considerable care here. He is not saying, as is sometimes thought, that God would not have become incarnate if humans had not sinned. What he is saying is that this question is rooted in the mystery of the divine will and goes beyond the natural scope of knowledge. The only basis we have for addressing such questions is divine revelation, and if we look at Scripture we see that "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners" (1 Timothy 1:15). Of course, Thomas is not basing his answer on a single verse; the entire story of God incarnate in Christ has the particular shape that it does because it is the story of incarnation as a remedy for sin. To ponder what the story would have been if humans had never sinned is simply to indulge in idle speculation. It is worth remembering, however, that those who say that God would not have become incarnate if humans had not sinned are also indulging in idle speculation that goes beyond what God has revealed.

What Thomas is establishing in this article is an approach to the incarnation that will shape his whole discussion. He begins with what God has in fact done in Christ, not with what God might have done; he is concerned with our actual history with God, not some possible alternative history. This is an approach that might be called "reasoning from revelation" - in other words, given what God has in fact done, how does this fit with other things that we hold to be true about God. So Thomas will not ask, "Should Christ have been born in Bethlehem?" (much less "Was Christ really born in Bethlehem?"), but rather, "Why was it fitting for Christ to be born in Bethlehem?"
5. The logic of this objection is that since marriage is a sign of the union of Christ and the church, and since Adam knew this sign, he therefore had faith in the incarnation. Aquinas does not dispute this point. After all, since the incarnation is foreknown by God, God could certainly share this knowledge with Adam. The objection takes a further step, arguing that Adam could not have foreknowledge of his sin, and therefore foreknowledge of the incarnation is something distinct from foreknowledge of sin. Again, Aquinas agrees, but adds that the distinction is that of cause and effect. Just as we can know an effect without knowing the cause (we can recognize a fire without knowing who lit it), so too Adam could know of the incarnation without knowing that it was occasioned by sin.
(All notes from Bauerschmidt's Holy Teaching.)