3.2 summary from a secondary source

I excerpted this from Knowing the Love of Christ: An Introduction to the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, by Michael Dauphinais & Matthew Levering. This section in the Summa is a brain-bender, at least for me. Hopefully the following overview will help.

Just before Jesus' death and resurrection, Philip asked Jesus, "Lord, show us the Father, and we shall be satisfied" (Jn 14:8). Jesus answered him, "Have I been with you so long, and yet you do not know me, Philip? He who has seen me has seen the Father." It is crucial to recognize, before we proceed, that the speculative analysis involved in understanding the Incarnation - that is, the "hypostatic union" of the divine and human natures in the Person of the Son - is simply a way of articulating what is meant by Jesus' declaration that whoever has seen him has seen the Father.

... Now we turn to the question of who Christ has to be in order to accomplish [our salvation.] ... We must guard against a distaste for the intricacies of Christological doctrines. In the centuries after Christ's death and resurrection, the Church never shied away from facing such doctrinal difficulties because she knew that if we misunderstand who Jesus is, then the reality of his salvation will be closed to us.

Following the creeds of the Church as formulated by early councils, St. Thomas holds that Jesus Christ possesses two natures, one human and one divine. Jesus Christ, however, only is one Person, the divine Person of the Son of God. The distinction between nature and person is recognized in everyday speech. If a child sees someone walking down the street and asks, "What is that?" the parent says, "That's a man." If the child asks, "Who is that?" the parent says, "That's Uncle Charlie." The concept "nature" answers the question "What is it?" and the concept "person" answers the question "Who is it?" When the disciples saw Jesus and asked, "What is Jesus?" both answers would be correct, "That's a man" and "That's God." When the disciples asked, "Who is Jesus?" the answer would be "That's the Son of God, the Second Person of the Trinity." [cf Mt 16:15-16] ...

It remains a mystery - something above, not contrary to, human reason - how the Second Person of the Trinity was born of a virgin, lived, suffered, died, and rose again. This incomprehension, however, does not require that we turn off our intellects. The reverse is the case. Because the divine nature is beyond our comprehension, it can take to itself a human nature without ceasing to be divine.

Consider it this way. Try to imagine a dog-man who was fully canine and fully human. You cannot. The reason why the two natures are incompatible with each other is that they are both created natures. As created natures they occupy the same field of action. In this way, they are in a competitive relationship - either a dog or a man, but not both. Now consider the union of two natures, one divine and one human. Here there is a noncompetitive relationship because the divine nature is the source of the human nature, just as it is the source of every other created nature. Our inability to comprehend the divine nature stems from its distinction from creation.

Once this distinction between the Creator and his creation is recognized, then the Incarnation ceases to be a contradiction. It is a miracle but not a logical impossibility. One being can be both God and man because the two natures do not exist side by side. Many of the early hersies about Christ viewed the divine and the human natures waging a turf-battle in the person of Jesus Christ. Many modern objectors to the Incarnation likewise assert that it is simply impossible for one thing to be both God and man. These objections err by treating the divine nature as simply another nature within the universe. Once God is confessed as the Creator then the Incarnation can be confessed in a way that avoids contradiction.

... This understanding of Jesus Christ allows us to speak correctly about him and to interpret correctly his deeds and words in the Gospels. It is true to say, as one of the early councils did, that "one of the Trinity suffered and died on the Cross." The Person of the Word is the only Person in Jesus Christ. The Person of the Word, therefore, is the only subject to whom we can attribute Christ's action. If someone asks how can God suffer since God is all-powerful and unchanging, then we can answer that the Word suffered not in his divine nature, but in his human nature. We also see in the Gospels Jesus performing great miracles over the physical forces of nature - the calming of the stormy sea and the raising of Lazarus. His human nature of itself had no power to perform these miracles. Yet his divine nature surely could do so. But the two natures cannot be separated since they are united in one person. In this way, whatever is done by the divine nature can be said of the human nature and vice versa.

... Christ's divinized human nature thus stands as the pattern after which we will also be divinized. Our divinization, however, is of a lesser order than Christ's since we become children of God not by nature, but by the adoption of grace. Nonetheless, the Incarnation of the Word makes possible the supernatural goal of human life, namely, sharing in God's own life.

3.1.3 Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?

Objection 1. It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still have become incarnate. As long as a cause remains, the effect also remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Many other things are to be considered in Incarnation of Christ besides absolution from sin"; and these were discussed earlier (3.1.2). Therefore if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

Objection 2. Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power to perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect. But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power manifested in a special manner by which power things infinitely distant are united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is God. And in this work especially the universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch as the last creature--viz. man--is united to the first principle--viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

Objection 3. Further, human nature has not been made more capable of grace by sin.^[1] But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from human nature any good it was capable of.^[2] Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

Objection 4. Further, God's predestination is eternal. But it is said of Christ (Romans 1:4): "Who was predestined the Son of God in power." Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should become incarnate, in order to fulfill God's predestination.

Objection 5. Further, the mystery of Incarnation was revealed to the first man, as is plain from Genesis 2:23, "This now is bone of my bones," and so on. The Apostle says this is "a great sacrament . . . in Christ and in the Church," as is plain from Ephesians 5:32. But man could not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels could not, as Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18). Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding what is set down in Luke 19:10, "For the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost"; "Therefore, if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would not have come." And on 1 Timothy 1:15, "Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners," a gloss^[3] says, "There was no cause of Christ's coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine."

I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent ought rather to be given to this opinion.

For such things as spring from God's will, and beyond the creature's due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, Incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate.^[4]

Reply to Objection 1. All the other causes which are assigned in the preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had not sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in order to know and carry out everything needful. But because man, on deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford him the remedy of salvation. Hence, on John 1:14, "And the Word was made flesh," St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): "Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals thee; for Christ came and overthrew the vices of the flesh."

Reply to Objection 2. The way things are produced from nothing shows in itself the infinity of divine power. Again, it suffices for the perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.

Reply to Objection 3. A double capability may be remarked in human nature: one, in respect of the order of natural power, and this is always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its natural capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine power, which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak of pertains to this. But God does not fulfill all such capabilities, otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is false, as stated earlier (1.105.6). But there is no reason why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom; hence it is written (Romans 5:20): "Where sin abounded, grace did more abound." Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we say: "O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer!"

Reply to Objection 4. Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to be brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the work of Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.

Reply to Objection 5. Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows the cause.^[5]

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Footnotes:
1. The unstated authority here is Romans 6:1-2.
2. The argument of this objection is as follows: (1) Human nature can be joined with divine nature; (2) sin cannot bring about anything good; (3) sin is not responsible for the capacity of human nature to be joined with divine nature; (4) this capacity would exist apart from sin; (5) God would not leave a human capacity unfulfilled; (6) therefore Christ would have become incarnate to join human and divine nature, even apart from sin. This argument raises an issue (i.e., no. 5) that would become important later in Catholic theology: the question of whether God is obliged to give human beings the beatific vision for the completion of their natures. See Aquinas's response to this objection below.
3. When Thomas refers to the "gloss" he is speaking of explanatory notes on scriptural texts that were originally written either between the lines or in the margins of Scripture. These notes began as simple one-word definitions of unfamiliar terms, but grew into more elaborate commentaries that sought to explain the literal sense of the text.
4. Thomas is stating his view with considerable care here. He is not saying, as is sometimes thought, that God would not have become incarnate if humans had not sinned. What he is saying is that this question is rooted in the mystery of the divine will and goes beyond the natural scope of knowledge. The only basis we have for addressing such questions is divine revelation, and if we look at Scripture we see that "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners" (1 Timothy 1:15). Of course, Thomas is not basing his answer on a single verse; the entire story of God incarnate in Christ has the particular shape that it does because it is the story of incarnation as a remedy for sin. To ponder what the story would have been if humans had never sinned is simply to indulge in idle speculation. It is worth remembering, however, that those who say that God would not have become incarnate if humans had not sinned are also indulging in idle speculation that goes beyond what God has revealed.

What Thomas is establishing in this article is an approach to the incarnation that will shape his whole discussion. He begins with what God has in fact done in Christ, not with what God might have done; he is concerned with our actual history with God, not some possible alternative history. This is an approach that might be called "reasoning from revelation" - in other words, given what God has in fact done, how does this fit with other things that we hold to be true about God. So Thomas will not ask, "Should Christ have been born in Bethlehem?" (much less "Was Christ really born in Bethlehem?"), but rather, "Why was it fitting for Christ to be born in Bethlehem?"
5. The logic of this objection is that since marriage is a sign of the union of Christ and the church, and since Adam knew this sign, he therefore had faith in the incarnation. Aquinas does not dispute this point. After all, since the incarnation is foreknown by God, God could certainly share this knowledge with Adam. The objection takes a further step, arguing that Adam could not have foreknowledge of his sin, and therefore foreknowledge of the incarnation is something distinct from foreknowledge of sin. Again, Aquinas agrees, but adds that the distinction is that of cause and effect. Just as we can know an effect without knowing the cause (we can recognize a fire without knowing who lit it), so too Adam could know of the incarnation without knowing that it was occasioned by sin.
(All notes from Bauerschmidt's Holy Teaching.)

3.1.2 Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate?

Objection 1. It would seem that it was not necessary for the reparation of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate. For since the Word of God is perfect God, as has been said (1.4), no power was added to Him by the assumption of flesh. Therefore, if the incarnate Word of God restored human nature, He could also have restored it without assuming flesh.

Objection 2. Further, for the restoration of human nature, which had fallen through sin, nothing more is required than that man should satisfy for sin. Now man can satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for God cannot require from man more than man can do, and since He is more inclined to be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act of sin to man's charge, so He ought to credit him with the contrary act. Therefore it was not necessary for the restoration of human nature that the Word of God should become incarnate.

Objection 3. Further, to revere God pertains especially to man's salvation; hence it is written (Malachi 1:6): "If, then, I be a father, where is my honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear?" But men revere God the more by considering Him as elevated above all, and far beyond man's senses, hence (Psalm 113:4) it is written: "The Lord is high above all nations, and His glory above the heavens"; and farther on: "Who is as the Lord our God?" which pertains to reverence. Therefore it would seem unfitting to man's salvation that God should be made like unto us by assuming flesh.

On the contrary, What frees the human race from perdition is necessary for the salvation of man. But the mystery of Incarnation is such; according to John 3:16: "God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting." Therefore it was necessary for man's salvation that God should become incarnate.

I answer that, A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in two ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is necessary for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end is attained better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In the first way it was not necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For God with His omnipotent power could have restored human nature in many other ways. But in the second way it was necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 10): "We shall also show that other ways were not wanting to God, to Whose power all things are equally subject; but that there was not a more fitting way of healing our misery."

Now this may be viewed with respect to our "furtherance in good."^[1]

• First, with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing God Himself Who speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): "In order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed human nature, established and founded faith."


• Secondly, with regard to hope, which is thereby greatly strengthened; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "Nothing was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how deeply God loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of this than that the Son of God should become a partner with us of human nature?"


• Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly enkindled by this; hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv): "What greater cause is there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love for us?" And he afterwards adds: "If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten to love in return."


• Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which He set us an example; hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp.): "Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown to man."


• Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us by Christ's humanity; for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): "God was made man, that man might be made God."

So also was this useful for our "withdrawal from evil."

• First, because man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honor him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): "Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they have no bodies."


• Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is man's dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xvi): "God has proved to us how high a place human nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to men as a true man." And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi): "Learn, O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature, refuse to return by evil deeds to your former worthlessness."


• Thirdly, because, "in order to do away with man's presumption, the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of ours went before," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17).


• Fourthly, because "man's pride, which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be convinced and cured by humility so great," as Augustine says in the same place.


• Fifthly, in order to free man from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 13), "ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ," and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man. Hence Pope Leo says in the same sermon: "Weakness is assumed by strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity, in order that one and the same Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise in the other--for this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He would not have brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not have set an example."

And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man's apprehension.

Reply to Objection 1. This reason has to do with the first kind of necessity, without which we cannot attain to the end.

Reply to Objection 2. Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two ways--first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or persons could not be made up adequately for the harm done to the whole of the nature; and also because a sin committed against God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man. Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed sufficient, imperfectly--i.e. in the acceptation of him who is content with it, even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction of Christ.

Reply to Objection 3. By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty; and in consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which is increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary, inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly drew us to know Him.

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Footnote:
1. Aquinas begins introducing what serves as a key structuring device for his discussions of human salvation: our salvation involves both our "furtherance in good" and our "removal from evil." ... In other words, savlation is not simply a matter of God forgiving human sin, but is a more comprehensive process of our being drawn beyond our natures so as to become "sharers of the divine nature" (2 Peter 1:4). (From Bauerschmidt's Holy Teaching.)

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3.1.1 Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate?

Objection 1. It would seem that it was not fitting^[1] for God to become incarnate. Since God from all eternity is the very essence of goodness, it was best for Him to be as He had been from all eternity. But from all eternity He had been without flesh. Therefore it was most fitting for Him not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not fitting for God to become incarnate.

Objection 2. Further, it is not fitting to unite things that are infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting union if one were "to paint a figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the head of a man" [Horace, Ars. poetica, line 1]. But God and flesh are infinitely apart; since God is most simple, and flesh is most composite--especially human flesh. Therefore it was not fitting that God should be united to human flesh.

Objection 3. Further, a body is as distant from the highest spirit as evil is from the highest good. But it was wholly unfitting that God, Who is the highest good, should assume evil. Therefore it was not fitting that the highest uncreated spirit should assume a body.

Objection 4. Further, it is not becoming that He Who surpassed the greatest things should be contained in the least, and He upon Whom rests the care of great things should leave them for lesser things. But God--Who takes care of the whole world--the whole universe of things cannot contain. Therefore it would seem unfitting that "He should be hid under the frail body of a babe in swathing bands, in comparison with Whom the whole universe is accounted as little; and that this Prince should quit His throne for so long, and transfer the government of the whole world to so frail a body," as Volusianus writes to Augustine (epistle 135).

On the contrary, It would seem most fitting that by visible things the invisible things of God should be made known; for to this end was the whole world made, as is clear from the word of the Apostle (Romans 1:20): "For the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." But, as John of Damascus says (On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 1), by the mystery of Incarnation are made known at once the goodness, the wisdom, the justice, and the power or might of God--"His goodness, for He did not despise the weakness of His own handiwork; His justice, since, on man's defeat, He caused the tyrant to be overcome by none other than man, and yet He did not snatch men forcibly from death; His wisdom, for He found a suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; His power, or infinite might, for there is nothing greater than for God to become incarnate . . ."

I answer that, A thing is "fitting" [conveniens] if it belongs to something because of its very nature; thus, to reason befits man, since this belongs to him because he is of a rational nature. But the very nature of God is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (On the Divine Names, ch. 1, no. 5). Hence, what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is plain from Dionysius (On the Divine Names, ch. 4, no. 1). Hence it belongs to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by "His so joining created nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these three--the Word, a soul and flesh," as Augustine says (De Trinitate, bk. 13, ch. 17). Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should become incarnate.

Reply to Objection 1. The mystery of Incarnation was not completed through God being changed in any way from the state in which He had been from eternity, but through His having united Himself to the creature in a new way, or rather through having united it to Himself.^[2] But it is fitting that a creature which by nature is mutable, should not always be in one way. And therefore, as the creature began to be, although it had not been before, so likewise, not having been previously united to God in Person, it was afterwards united to Him.

Reply to Objection 2. To be united to God in unity of person was not fitting to human flesh, according to its natural endowments, since it was above its dignity; nevertheless, it was fitting that God, by reason of His infinite goodness, should unite it to Himself for man's salvation.

Reply to Objection 3. Every mode of being wherein any creature whatsoever differs from the Creator has been established by God's wisdom, and is ordained to God's goodness. For God, Who is uncreated, immutable, and incorporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures for His own goodness. And so also the evil of punishment was established by God's justice for God's glory. But evil of fault is committed by withdrawing from the art of the Divine wisdom and from the order of the Divine goodness. And therefore it could be fitting to God to assume a nature created, mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty, but it did not become Him to assume the evil of fault.

Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine replies in the letter to Volusian (epistle 137, ch. 2): "The Christian doctrine nowhere holds that God was so joined to human flesh as either to desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were, contract within this frail body, the care of governing the universe. This is the thought of men unable to see anything but corporeal things . . . God is great not in mass, but in might. Hence the greatness of His might feels no straits in narrow surroundings. Nor, if the passing word of a man is heard at once by many, and wholly by each, is it incredible that the abiding Word of God should be everywhere at once?" Hence nothing unfitting arises from God becoming incarnate.

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Footnotes:
1. In the first sentence of the first article of the third part of the Summa we encounter the extremely important term conveniens. In this translation it is generally rendered as "fitting" or "suitable." In using this term Aquinas is indicating a particular kind of reasoning that one employs in sacra doctrina. For example, Aquinas sees the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ as a truth given to us in revelation. It is not something that we can "prove" through the use of reason ... However, there is still a role for reason here, not in proving the incarnation, but in manifesting how it fits together (convenire means literally "to come together") with other things that Christians hold true about God. This term is especially prominent in the third part of the Summa, which deals with Christ. In this part, Aquinas repeatedly inquires after the convenientia of various things that Christians hold to be revealed truth. (From Bauerschmidt's Holy Teaching.)
2. Here Aquinas employs a distinction that he made earlier (1.13.7) between a "logical" (or "notional") relation and a "real" relation. Suffice it to say that for Aquinas the incarnation does not involve a change in God because God's relation to creatures is a logical one. To use a rough analogy, if I teach you to speak French, you will have changed (you can now speak French), but I will remain unchanged (I could speak French before, and I can speak French now), even though now you can say something about me that you could not say before (i.e., "You taught me French"). To use another analogy, if you are standing on my right and then move around to my left, your position relative to me has changed, but I have not undergone any change, even though you can say something about me that you could not say before (i.e., "You are standing on my right"). Becoming human is a similar kind of thing on God's part; it involves a change in creatures (in the case of the incarnation, the human nature of Jesus) but not in God. (From Bauerschmidt's Holy Teaching.)

Structure of the Summa

From A Summa of the Summa by Peter Kreeft:

The structural outline of the Summa Theologica is a mirror of the structural outline of reality. It begins in God, Who is "in the beginning". It then proceeds to the act of creation and a consideration of creatures, centering on man, who alone is created in the image of God. Then it moves to man's return to God through his life of moral and religious choice, and culminates in the way or means to that end: Christ and His Church. Thus the overall scheme of the Summa, like that of the universe, is an exitus-redditus, an exit from and a return to God, Who is both Alpha and Omega. ... The structure of the Summa, and of the universe, is dynamic. It is not like information in a library, but like blood in a body.




From Holy Teaching: Introducing the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas by Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt:

The format of the Summa theologiae can appear confusing at first, but once you grasp how Thomas proceeds it is in fact a model of clarity.

The Summa is structured in three "parts." The prima pars (first part) concerns God and the creation of the universe. The secunda pars (second part) concerns human action and is subdivided into a theoretical treatment of human action (the prima secunda, or first half of the second part) and a detailed treatment of human virtues and human vices (the secunda secunda, or second half of the second part). The tertia pars (third part) concerns Christ: his person and work; the continuation of his work in the church through the sacraments; and his second coming and the consummation of creation (this last section was never written). ...

Each part contains numerous "questions," which are further subdivided into "articles." ... The articles of the Summa grow out of a medieval teaching practice known as "disputation."... In the Summa, Thomas refines this form, boiling it down to its essentials:

• He states the thesis in the form of a question.
• He raises objections against the thesis - usually two or three, but occasionally more.
• He offers a counterposition, introduced by sed contra (on the contrary), which is almost always reduced to a single counterpoint and usually cites a biblical passage or other authority, instead of making an argument.
• He gives his own response, introduced by respondeo (I answer) - usually inclined towards the sed contra, but not always.
• He marshals replies to the objections.

We might note a few key points about reading an article. First, it is never enough to read the responsio alone, since Thomas sometimes makes his most important point in the replies to the objections. Second, the objections are not "straw men." Of all the possible objections, Thomas chose those he thought most convincing. Often an objection is at least half way, and some times three-quarters of the way, to the truth. Third, you should not presume that the sed contra is Thomas's position. Sometimes it misses the truth as much as the objections, albeit in a different direction. Finally, we should note how this structure, based as it is on the disputation, is dynamic. There is always an argument that is moving forward through objection and counter-objection. Indeed, we should think of the Summa as a vast, extended discussion of the truth of the Christian faith, a discussion we are invited to join.

New blog: Summa 3 Reading Group

What is the group reading? Articles by St. Thomas Aquinas about Christ, from part 3 of his Summa Theologiae.

Do I have to buy a book? Nope. Every Sunday, I'll post another reading onto the blog. (The entire Summa is available for free on the Internet.)

What's the commitment? None required, it's really flexible. If you want to participate, do so when you're able, to the extent you're able.

How do I participate? You don't have to sign up for anything.
1. Go to the blog to read the weekly articles
2. (Optional) Ask questions and discuss. (Click on "comments" underneath the article.)

Who is welcome? Anybody. I'm iniviting the Third Friday Group from Epiphany and some alumni of the St. Robert Bellarmine Newman Center. If you know someone else who may be interested in this sort of thing, feel free to send them the link.

The Summa seems intimidating. Am I prepared to read it and qualified to discuss it? Personally, I'm neither prepared nor qualified, but anything worth doing is worth doing badly.

Any other questions? Feel free to ask!